blog: updates (#1400)

blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.md

@@ -17,23 +17,23 @@ permalink: "/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html"
 
 When we first launched the app in March the response on Reddit was: _"Have you been audited or should we just ignore you?"_.
 
-We have a growing number of enthusiasts using SimpleX Chat who can accept the security risks of unaudited system, but the users who depend on their security were patiently waiting until some independent experts validate our claims.
+We have a growing number of enthusiasts using SimpleX Chat who can accept the security risks of unaudited system, but the users who depend on their security were patiently waiting until some independent experts review our codebase.
 
-[Trail of Bits](https://www.trailofbits.com/about), a US based security and technology consultancy whose clients include big tech companies, governmental agencies and major blockchain projects, had 2 engineers reviewing SimpleX Chat, specifically [simplexmq library](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq) that is responsible for all cryptography and networking of SimpleX platform.
+[Trail of Bits](https://www.trailofbits.com/about), a US based security and technology consultancy whose clients include big tech companies, governmental agencies and major blockchain projects, had 2 engineers reviewing SimpleX Chat for one calendar week, specifically [simplexmq library](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq) that is responsible for all cryptography and networking of SimpleX platform.
 
 2 medium and 2 low severity issues were identified, all of which require a high difficulty attack to exploit – the attacker would need to have a privileged access to the system, may need to know complex technical details, or must discover other weaknesses to exploit them. 3 of these issues are already fixed in v4.2.
 
-Overall we have SimpleX Chat in a decent shape, with most reviewed areas other than identified issues being marked as "satisfactory", and authentication and access controls as "strong".
+In the course of the audit, Trail of Bits assessed the maturity of the [simplexmq library](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq) across eight categories and found five of them to be strong or satisfactory.
 
-The issues are explained below, and the full security review is available via [Trail of Bits publications](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications#technology-product-reviews).
+Explained below is our understanding of the issues, as well as fixes implemented by the SimpleX Chat team after project completion. The full security review is available via [Trail of Bits publications](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/SimpleXChat.pdf).
 
-We are hugely thankful to Trails Of Bits and their engineers for the work they did, helping us identify these issues and strengthen the security of SimpleX Chat.
+We are hugely thankful to Trail of Bits and their engineers for the work they did, helping us identify these issues and supporting the ongoing efforts to make Simple Chat more secure.
 
 ### Medium severity issues
 
 #### X3DH key exchange for double ratchet protocol
 
-We made a mistake implementing X3DH key exchange - the key derivation function was not applied to the result of concatenation of three DH operations. The attack to exploit this mistake has high complexity, as it would require compromising one of private keys generated by the clients, and also it would only affect forward secrecy until break-in recovery happens (after both sides sent some messages).
+We made a mistake implementing X3DH key exchange - the key derivation function was not applied to the result of concatenation of three DH operations. The attack to exploit this mistake has high difficulty, as it would require compromising one of private keys generated by the clients, and also it would only affect forward secrecy until break-in recovery happens (after both sides sent some messages).
 
 Please note that SimpleX does not perform X3DH with long-term identity keys, as the SimpleX protocol does not rely on long-term keys to identify client devices. Therefore, the impact of compromising a key will be less severe, as it will affect only the secrets of the connection where the key was compromised.
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ This issue is fixed in version 4.2 in [this PR](https://github.com/simplex-chat/
 
 The problem here is that the memory with cryptographic keys can be swapped to the storage and potentially accessed by an attacker who has root-level access to the device (or the level of access required to access swap file of the application). So, if you are running SimpleX Chat on desktop you could improve its security by running it in an isolated container.
 
-On mobile operating systems it is less severe as each application already runs in its own container, and applications do not share access to their swap areas (e.g., on Android swap is a [compressed area in RAM](https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory-management) not accessible to other applications).
+In our opinion, on mobile operating systems it is less severe as each application already runs in its own container, and applications do not share access to their swap areas (e.g., on Android swap is a [compressed area in RAM](https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory-management) not accessible to other applications).
 
 To exploit this issue an attacker needs to have a privileged system access to the device. Also, we believe [Haskell generational garbage collection](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/1993/01/gen-gc-for-haskell.pdf) makes the lifetime of unused memory lower than in other languages.
 
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ We will be addressing this issue in the near future, possibly by using library [
 
 ### Low severity issues
 
-#### The functions that do string padding and unpadding can throw exceptions
+#### The string padding function is incorrect for long messages, and the string unpadding function throws exception for short messages
 
-Both these issues are fixed in 4.2 in [this PR](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/pull/547/files), with the additional unit tests, and we also validated that even before the fix the strings that would cause such exception were never passed to this function – we could not find the possibility of the attack that would succeed because of this issue.
+Both these issues are fixed in 4.2 in [this PR](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/pull/547/files), with the additional unit tests, and we also validated that even before the fix the strings that would cause such exception were never passed to this function – The SimpleX Chat team could not find the possibility of the attack that would succeed because of this issue.
 
 ### What's next